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Lasting Legacies:  
Contemporary Struggles and Historical Dispossession in South Africa 
Robin L. Turner, Butler University 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary postapartheid South African land struggles are haunted by the long shadow of historical 
dispossession. While apartheid-era forced removals are justifiably infamous, these traumatic events were 
moments in the more extended, less frequently referenced, and more expansive process that 
fundamentally shaped the South African terrain well before 1948. The South African Republic’s mid-
nineteenth-century assertion of ownership of all land north of the Vaal River and south of the Limpopo 
marked the start of a long process of racialized dispossession that rendered black people’s residence in 
putatively white areas highly contingent and insecure throughout the former Transvaal. This article 
analyzes the connections between past dispossession and contemporary rural land and natural resource 
struggles in the Limpopo and North West provinces, contending that addressing South Africa’s vexed 
present requires a fuller reckoning with its past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Awakening on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not 
actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth.”1 This opening passage from Solomon 
Plaatje’s classic Native Life in South Africa underscores the importance of land to well-being and 
belonging. State-led and state-sanctioned dispossession causes suffering and signals political 
exclusion, rendering the dispossessed denizens who are subject to the state but not full members 
of the polity. Highlighting the adverse effects of the Natives Land Act of 1913 in its unsuccessful 
plea for repeal of that act and greater recognition of native rights, Native Life evocatively describes 
the impoverishment, illness, and premature death caused by the expulsion of black people from 
putatively white places and draws attention to prior state “land grabbing” in what became South 
Africa.2 Following the incorporation of Thaba Nchu into the Orange Free State, successive 
governments “confiscated all the land not yet surveyed,” created legal barriers to black land 
acquisition, and then stopped granting the exemptions through which some had secured land title 
in 1900, thereby ensuring that many black people lacked state-recognized rights to land and could 
not obtain them.3 State-led and state-sanctioned racialized dispossession in present-day South 
Africa began before 1913, as this example highlights, and continued long thereafter.4 White 
supremacist governments further racialized the national territory for most of the twentieth century, 
circumscribing black property rights and displacing millions of people. 
Contending that twenty-first-century natural resource use and land rights conflicts are haunted by 
the long shadow of historical dispossession, this article examines the relationship between this past 
and the present in the South African interior. Focusing on the regions that now encompass the 
Mapungubwe National Park and Cultural Landscape in Limpopo province and the Madikwe Game 
Reserve in the North West province, I describe recent land and natural resource struggles and detail 
the dispossession and partial displacement of black people from these regions (see fig. 1). These 
changes facilitated enduring transformations of the rural terrain and political economy as well as 
adversely affecting black denizens, producing constellations of interests that not only render full 
restoration of lost land unlikely but also hinder dispossessed people’s efforts to gain greater access 
to and control over land and other natural resources. 
 
Figure 1.  
The Madikwe and Mapungubwe Regions, South Africa 
Looking beyond what Cheryl Walker terms a “‘master narrative’ of loss and restoration” focused 
on providing redress for apartheid forced removals, this article delineates how black landholders 
in the Mapungubwe and Madikwe regions were dispossessed over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and attends to subsequent land-use change.5 Conceptualizing dispossession as 
an extended, uneven, contested process of losing control over a resource rather than a singular 
legal event, I discuss key moments in the formal, de jure seizure of black-held land and trace the 
slower, uneven process through which many black people were effectively dispossessed, losing de 
facto control over the land in these places.6 The nineteenth-century refusal to recognize long-
resident peoples’ property rights to the lands where they lived, farmed, hunted, and traded laid the 
foundation for diminution of their access to—“ability to derive benefits from”—these lands and 
natural resources, and for the subsequent displacement of many black denizens.7 The history of 
racialized dispossession extends beyond the post–Native Land Act land losses for which South 
Africans are constitutionally entitled to redress.8 
Analysis of recent struggles in the Madikwe and Mapungubwe regions illustrates the enduring 
effects of dispossession. Large expanses of public and privately held land in these regions are now 
devoted to nature conservation and tourism. However, the coerced displacement of black people 
from Mapungubwe and Madikwe was not directly intertwined with the expansion of the nature 
conservation estate or its depopulation as in the better-known Kruger National Park, Kalahari 
Gemsbok National Park, Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Game Reserve, and St. Lucia Wetland Park cases.9 
Showing that displacement facilitated the establishment of conservation areas in Madikwe and 
Mapungubwe nevertheless, I contend that these changes now structure current land-use debates to 
the disadvantage of the dispossessed. Situating its analysis of twenty-first-century land and natural 
use conflicts, attending to longer, place-specific histories of racialized dispossession, and focusing 
on land-use change rather than memory or social differentiation, this article makes a distinctive 
contribution to scholarship on the South African past and present.10 
The next section discusses contemporary land and natural resource use struggles in the 
Mapungubwe and Madikwe regions. Based on field research carried out in 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011, 
and 2015, the narratives draw from interviews with current and former residents of these places, 
land claimants, government officials, businesspeople, and conservation advocates, and from public 
and privately held records, media coverage, and other documents. The subsequent section delves 
into the specific histories of these regions. Informed by historical scholarship on the succession of 
polities in which present-day Mapungubwe and Madikwe were situated between 1830 and 1994, 
I trace the dispossession and gradual displacement of black landholders from these regions, 
consider the land changes occurring in the aftermath of dispossession, and analyze their political 
economic effects.11 
Struggling over Land and Natural Resources 
Centering on past, present, and future property rights and natural resource use, contemporary 
struggles in the Mapungubwe and Madikwe regions show how past dispossession continues to 
shape present struggles. The Machete land claim, Vele colliery, and Barokologadi land claim 
conflicts described in this section illuminate the uneven terrain on which South Africans now 
contend for rights to and influence over valued rural territory and highlight the barriers to reversing 
historical dispossession. Recognition of the losses suffered by Machete and Barokologadi people 
did not enable either to secure full access to and control over the land they once held. These cases 
suggest that public policies intended to redress segregation and apartheid-era land loss grant the 
dispossessed and their descendants a venue in which to articulate historical injury and to make 
claims on the state but do not alter the dominant understandings, land-use patterns, and 
constellations of interests that favor present rights holders. 
Nature and Heritage Threatened? Mining and Land Restitution in Mapungubwe 
Situated in northernmost Limpopo province at the confluence of the Limpopo and Shashe Rivers 
and first settled between one million to 250 thousand BCE, the Mapungubwe region was the locus 
of a sophisticated civilization between 900 and 1290 CE. Rediscovered in 1932–33, ancient 
Mapungubwe garnered renewed attention as a symbol of Africa’s rich past and potential future, 
exemplified in these comments by then president Thabo Mbeki: 
In 1932 an Afrikaner prospector named Van Graan approached a strange-looking outcrop in the Limpopo 
valley known as Mapungubwe Hill, in the area where the borders of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe 
meet. Mapungubwe Hill held great mysterious power over the local people who always turned their backs on 
it when outsiders attempted to discuss it. … I think we will all agree that much still needs to be learned about 
the full significance of Mapungubwe, her civilization and her technological advancement. … The source of 
our power comes not only from our present, but from our past.12 
The Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2003. 
 
Figure 2.  
The Limpopo-Shashe Confluence Region 
The Mapungubwe region now encompasses numerous nature and cultural heritage tourism, game 
farming and ranching, and commercial agriculture enterprises, the Mapungubwe National Park 
and Cultural Heritage Landscape, and the immense De Beers Venetia diamond mine (see fig. 2). 
Providing an anchor point for nature and cultural heritage tourism since its establishment in 1998, 
the Mapungubwe National Park expanded from three farms in 2001 to 19,800 hectares of land in 
two large sections in 2008, as South African National Parks and the Peace Parks Foundation 
worked toward establishing the Greater Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area across the 
confluence region in South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.13 Khoisan rock art and material 
remnants of ancient Mapungubwe are presented and preserved at the national park and scattered 
well beyond its borders. 
Conflict has roiled Mapungubwe for the last several years as two land restitution claims and a 
proposed coal mine brought the region’s future into question. Seeking redress for post–June 1913 
displacement, land claims by Machete and Tshivula people could displace current land rights 
holders and had the potential to produce a shift away from conservation tourism and commercial 
agriculture if the settlement resulted in transfer of unrestricted title to the claimants. The proposed 
colliery was seen by its opponents as a threat to regional biodiversity, cultural heritage, agriculture, 
and tourism. Both developments spurred mobilization within and beyond the Mapungubwe region, 
with current landowners and land users opposing the land claim while the anti–coal mine campaign 
brought together claimants, farmers, tourism businesspeople, and conservationists. Discussing the 
land claim and colliery in turn, I consider the differing constellations of interests arising from past 
dispossession and present land use and describe how contending parties have used heritage, 
historical connection to the land, and their productive or sustainable resource management as 
resources in these struggles. 
Initially filed in 1998, the Machete and Tshivula collective land restitution claims first became 
public on July 7, 2006, when the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights gave notice of these 
claims and two others to large expanses of northern Limpopo land.14 The properties listed in these 
overlapping claims included part of Mapungubwe National Park and nearby farms targeted for 
park inclusion, part of the De Beers–owned Venetia Limpopo Nature Reserve and Venetia 
diamond mine, and portions of several properties then used for farming, game ranching, and 
tourism. Two years after gazetting these claims, the regional commission issued a report that 
deemed the Machete claim largely valid and dismissed the overlapping portions of the Tshivhula 
claim. Stating that the Machete had possessed “indigenous ownership rights” to fifty-six farms 
from which they had been gradually dispossessed over several decades, the 2008 report called for 
“a detailed feasibility research study” of restoration.15 
The Mapungubwe land claim brought the contrasting perspectives and interests of current 
landowners, land users, and dispossessed people to the surface. Many landowners and land users 
responded to the Machete and Tshivhula land claims with skepticism. Since the land on which the 
claimants and their ancestors lived, farmed, grazed livestock, and buried their dead is now 
immensely valuable, some dismissed the claims as ill-founded resource grabs that misrepresent 
regional history. Skeptics asserted that black denizens of Mapungubwe had lost land rights long 
before 1913, that the Machete and Tshivhula had chosen to leave the region, and that current 
politics rather than historical facts were driving the commission’s validation of much of the 
Machete claim.16 One person with strong ties to the region since 1965 told me, “They [the 
Tshivula] were advised by the lawyers as to what to claim. … The majority of the people 
voluntarily left the area because of drought in the 1930s. The Limpopo River was dry, and there 
were few wells. People came looking at Mapungubwe because they’ve heard that there was gold. 
But many moved because it was impossible to survive, so it was voluntary removal.”17 
Partly a strategic response by those seeking to retain state-recognized rights and access to regional 
resources, counterclaims opposing Mapungubwe land claims also reflect widely held 
interpretations of South Africa’s past that conflate the loss of formal land rights and effective 
dispossession: people use and exert control over land to which they do not hold title, as discussed 
in the introduction. South African land claim commissions and courts have validated numerous 
restitution claims involving untitled “beneficial occupiers” displaced after the Natives Land Act 
of 1913.18 In the Mapungubwe region, as subsequent sections detail, nineteenth-century white 
settler polities withheld state-recognized property rights from black landholders in the nineteenth 
century but did not fully control their putative territory; most black denizens were not fully 
dispossessed before the twentieth century. 
The struggle over the Mapungubwe restitution claim has been waged mostly behind closed doors 
for nearly a decade. Although those with valid land claims are entitled to restitution, granting the 
Machete claimants even restricted title preserving the conservation status of claimed farms in the 
national park and Venetia Limpopo Nature Reserve, a far more likely outcome than conveyance 
of unrestricted property rights, would be extraordinarily expensive, as would purchase of  
comparable land or other equitable redress.19 “It is an agreement which will probably cost 
billions,” as then land commissioner Tele Mapoto said in 2009, without noting that the national 
government has never fully funded restitution.20 
Research to date suggests that only model claims—those involving the forced removal of a group 
at a well-defined point in time—and model claimants—those possessing strong, politically savvy 
leadership and the appearance of unity—have secured relatively swift, somewhat satisfactory 
settlements.21 Subject to coerced displacement over an extended period of time and now spatially 
dispersed, the Machete are not model claimants and have not managed to present a united front.22 
With little progress toward settlement evident in the late 2000s beyond the acquisition of three 
farms, a small contingent of claimants moved to Den Staat, a commission-purchased property 
situated between Mapungubwe National Park and a commercial irrigated farm.23 Disrupting a 
pending partnership between the Machete claimant organization and the neighboring commercial 
farm, the claimant settlers began growing tomatoes and harvesting wildlife despite their lack of a 
title deed, of capital to repair the degraded infrastructure left behind by the prior owner, and of 
support from the commission or other claimants. Most Machete claimants did not relocate to Den 
Staat, instead continuing to lobby for resolution of their claim with little success. 
Failure to resolve the Machete claim has not only frustrated claimants but also affected landowners 
and land users who must secure commission permission for sale, lease, or development of claimed 
properties, impeding efforts to consolidate the Mapungubwe National Park and create the Greater 
Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area. The commission has granted permission for South 
African National Parks to acquire farms along the periphery of Mapungubwe National Park, but 
the agency has not pursued this strategy.24 Reasoning that “it still doesn’t make sense to buy land 
when you might lose it,” as an agency executive commented, South African National Parks has 
instead prioritized reaching contractual agreements with private landowners to incorporate their 
land into the national park and seeking a similar agreement with the Machete.25 The claimants, 
landowners, and land users were still negotiating with a shifting set of land claim commissioners 
and officials in 2015. 
As 2008 drew to a close, word spread that Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) sought to mine coal in 
the Mapungubwe region.26 The proposed mine, the Vele Colliery, would be built on an 8,662 
hectare area along the Limpopo River located about 7 kilometers east of Mapungubwe National 
Park’s western boundary and 27 kilometers away from Mapungubwe Hill.27 CoAL sought to 
extract up to 5 million tons of coal each year through underground and opencast (strip) mining for 
at least thirty years, removing and processing large quantities of soil. The colliery also would 
extract up to 5,000 cubic meters per day from the Limpopo River and aquifer. CoAL submitted an 
application for mining rights to the Department of Mineral Resources in November 2008 and 
began pursuing other required authorizations after company representatives met with municipal, 
provincial, and national officials and a few landowners.28 The department then ordered the 
company to submit a scoping report, an environmental management plan, and an environmental 
impact assessment. 
Mineral extraction is governed by numerous acts, regulations, and formal procedures in South 
Africa, as elsewhere.29 Officially, if not in practice, companies must jump several official hurdles 
to establish a new mine, obtaining a variety of licenses, permits, and impact assessments from 
different government agencies including the Department of Mineral Resources and other less 
powerful agencies. The Vele Colliery struggle was waged concurrently in government agencies, 
in the courts, and among various local, national, and global publics. 
CoAL initially made steady progress by focusing on the relatively supportive national Department 
of Mineral Resources and limiting its interactions with likely opponents. CoAL representatives 
had informal discussions and meetings with interested and affected parties between January and 
November 2008 but did not contact prominent Mapungubwe landowner Paul Hatty, who owned a 
tourist lodge less than 10 kilometers away from the proposed mine, chaired the Mapungubwe 
National Park Committee for several years, and led the Limpopo Valley Conservancy. CoAL also 
made no direct contact with the Department of Environmental Affairs and the South African 
Heritage Resources Agency, which have statutory responsibility for the Mapungubwe National 
Park and Cultural Landscape UNESCO World Heritage Site. The meeting with these agencies and 
CoAL took place only eight days before the January 31, 2009, deadline for comments on the Vele 
Colliery scoping report, which was subsequently extended to February 16. Several of the parties 
most interested and affected by the proposed mine thus had little opportunity to participate in the 
early stages of the approval process. “I believe the mine thought they could get away with stealth. 
They tried to do it under cover. That is what has increased the ire of those against the mine,” Hatty 
commented.30 
Opposition to the proposed Vele Colliery was evident from the moment word began to spread. As 
Alex Schoeman, a South African archaeologist and former Mapungubwe resident, said, “I heard 
over Christmas. They [CoAL] were granted rights over the holdings. It came out of the blue 
completely. … My first thought was ‘Hell, no! This has to be a mistake.’ In the end it was true.”31 
The Endangered Wildlife Trust and the Association of Southern African Professional 
Archaeologists each submitted critical comments on the scoping report in January 2009. The South 
African Heritage Resources Agency, the Department of Environmental Affairs, and the Peace 
Parks Foundation expressed concern regarding the mine’s potential adverse effects on regional 
natural and heritage resources in multiple venues. Mapungubwe land claimants, landowners, and 
land users expressed opposition to the mine at the first open public meeting in April 2009, detailing 
an array of overlapping concerns regarding heritage, biodiversity, farming, and tourism. 
The conflict entered a new stage when the Department of Mineral Resources issued a mining 
license for the Vele Colliery in January 2010. Local activists then formed the Mapungubwe Action 
Group to campaign against the mine and created the Save Mapungubwe Coalition with six 
established nonprofit organizations: the Association of Southern African Professional 
Archaeologists, BirdLife South Africa, the Endangered Wildlife Trust, the Peace Parks 
Foundation, Wilderness Foundation South Africa, and the World Wide Fund for Nature South 
Africa. 
The Mapungubwe Action Group brought together a disparate group of people united principally 
by their opposition to the proposed mine: farmers, farm managers, and tourism business-people, 
Machete land claimants, Vhangona cultural activists, and shareholders in the Northern Tuli Game 
Reserve, situated across the Limpopo in Botswana (see fig. 2).32 Mapungubwe Action Group 
activists continuously highlighted the symbolic, affective, and material threats posed by the Vele 
Colliery on television, film, websites, and other media while specifying the mine’s potential 
adverse effects in interactions with decision makers. “Our national heritage is being put at risk. … 
‘You bestow the Order of Mapungubwe. How can you allow the place after which so prestigious 
an award is named to be destroyed?,’” said land claim leader Lucas Machete in a National 
Geographic article.33 “This is very short-term thinking. … Mining is for 30 or 40 years. Tourism 
is forever,” a white landowner told me.34 “We would not allow anyone to come and destroy the 
heritage that will be there for a ‘project’ that will last 25 to 30 years … just for financial gain. We 
would never in our life let down the expectations of our ancestors,” said a Vhangona Cultural 
Movement leader.35 
The Save Mapungubwe Coalition partners led the bureaucratic and legal struggle against the mine. 
Coalition members appealed the issuance of mining rights and the environmental management 
program approval appeal in 2010, seeking immediate suspension of the mining right, challenging 
the process through which these approvals were granted, and elaborating upon the mine’s 
substantial adverse effects. In August 2010, shortly after the coalition sought urgent interdicts, the 
Department of Environmental Affairs ordered CoAL to cease several construction activities begun 
without prior environmental authorization and the Department of Water Affairs ordered CoAL to 
“cease all unlawful water use immediately.” 
The Mapungubwe Action Group Save Mapungubwe Coalition campaign garnered international 
media coverage, motivated UNESCO inspection visits and expressions of concern, and led to a 
months-long suspension of construction activities but did not achieve its ultimate objective. The 
Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Environmental Affairs issued the requisite 
licenses and authorizations in 2011, and the minister of water affairs then lifted the water license 
suspension in 2012 without hearings on the Save Mapungubwe Coalition appeal.36 The September 
2011 announcement that CoAL, South African National Parks, and the Department of 
Environmental Affairs had agreed to work together to conserve the Mapungubwe Cultural 
Landscape affirmed that CoAL had secured sufficient support from national decision makers to 
proceed. The Save Mapungubwe Coalition has focused on damage control since 2011, seeking to 
protect the landscape first through direct negotiations with CoAL and then through the Vele 
Colliery Environmental Monitoring Committee.37 The Vele colliery began operating in 2012 but 
its long-term prospects are uncertain, as the coal is of lower-than-expected quality. CoAL 
suspended mine operations and laid off workers in 2013 but has indicated that operations should 
resume in 2016.38 
Recent struggles in Mapungubwe demonstrate the pressing need to more fully reckon with the 
material and discursive legacies of South Africa’s past in its postapartheid present. In each case, 
activists pressured government officials to not only acknowledge black and indigenous peoples’ 
long history in the region but also prioritize redressing dispossession and protecting heritage in 
land rights and natural resource use decisions. Machete claimants used elders’ knowledge of burial 
sites and other markers of past residence to buttress assertions that they had previously possessed 
land rights, while anticolliery activists accentuated the heritage, conservation, and long-term 
economic value of Mapungubwe to the region, nation, and world.39 These mobilizations succeeded 
in securing recognition but failed to accomplish their objectives. Confronted with cultural heritage 
and dispossession on the one hand and biodiversity, tourism, and mining on the other, national 
decision makers appeared to prioritize high-value present and future land uses over redressing past 
dispossession. 
Conservation versus Restoration: The Barokologadi Campaign 
The Barokologadi restitution struggle illustrates how post-dispossession land-use change has 
influenced property rights and natural resource debates in the Madikwe region. The collective land 
restitution claim T. Z. Molwantwa filed on behalf of the Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe on July 2, 
1995, marked the beginning of an extended struggle over land rights, land use, and appropriate 
redress. This was a model claim with model claimants in many respects. Forcibly removed from 
Melorane in 1949–50, with a politically astute, well-networked leader who mobilized well-off 
urban Barokologadi and those residing in former Bophuthatswana, Barokologadi claimants 
presented a united front despite internal divisions.40 Land-use change presented a substantial 
barrier to redress, nevertheless, as the place that the Barokologadi called Melorane now comprised 
a large section of Madikwe Game Reserve, a nature conservation and tourism site, and several 
properties leased to baruakgomo (black emerging farmers) and other individuals. 
Contention over the Barokologadi claim centered on the appropriate form and scope of restitution: 
restoration, compensation, or alternate land. Affected land users opposed restoration and sought to 
retain the claimed land by emphasizing that the Barokologadi had not owned Melorane, by 
asserting their present state-recognized property rights, and by highlighting their improvements to 
the land and their formal and less formal interactions with decision makers throughout the claim 
negotiations. Madikwe lessee Barry York challenged the validity of the Barokologadi claim, 
asserting in court and in other venues that he had laboriously transformed a degraded farm into the 
successful Sebele game hunting and cattle farming operation on the understanding that he could 
purchase the land. The baruakgomo also lobbied heavily to retain use of and secure title to the 
leased properties as the North West Parks and Tourism Board pressed to maintain the integrity of 
Madikwe Game Reserve. 
Relying on the discursive erasure of past dispossession and the prioritization of present land uses 
for persuasive efficacy, restoration opponents met with success at first. The provincial State Land 
Disposal Committee officials moved to transfer title to Barry York and the baruakgomo even 
though no transfers on land subject to published restitution claims are supposed to be processed; 
restitution officials intervened to halt the transfers.41 Regional Land Claims Commission initially 
accepted opponents’ framing of the claim as well, characterizing a settlement offer in which the 
claimants would have gained title to Sebele farm but not to land inside Madikwe Game Reserve 
as “a clear upgrading of the rights from Beneficial Occupation to Ownership Rights” in 2003 
correspondence.42 The Barokologadi Land Claims Committee consistently rejected these 
arguments and sought restoration of Melorane throughout their prolonged negotiations with the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, the North West Parks and Tourism Board, and other 
parties from 1999 onward, using pickets and presentations at national and provincial land summits 
to draw attention to their cause. 
The Barokologadi claimants achieved a partial victory in 2007, securing the first state recognition 
of these people as rights-bearing titleholders to Melorane in their history. That year, the 
Barokologadi Communal Property Association (CPA), the North West Parks and Tourism Board, 
the Commission for Restitution of Land Rights, and other government departments signed a 
binding agreement stating the Barokologadi CPA would receive title to all of the claimed 
properties, that the land inside Madikwe Game Reserve would remain a protected part of that 
reserve, and that the reserve land would be managed through a comanagement agreement. The 
agreement also stated that the claimants would receive financial compensation “for the loss of 
enjoyment, use, and occupation of the claimed land falling within Madikwe Game Reserve” and 
that the CPA would receive restitution grants, planning grants, and financial aid to support 
development of the restored land.43 The Barokologadi settlement marked both a departure from 
and a consolidation of past dispossession: decision makers limited Barokologadi access to and 
control over Madikwe Game Reserve but recognized and compensated them for this loss. 
“We have to make sure that we use the land appropriately so that it can benefit everybody. … Now 
that we have won the land we have to prepare how we are going to use it,” T. Z. Molwantwa told 
me, as the likely scope of the settlement became clear.44 Granted restricted title to a portion of 
Madikwe Game Reserve and unfettered title to the remainder of Melorane, the CPA decided to 
create commercial agricultural and tourism enterprises rather than attempt to settle their dispersed 
membership on the restored land. The Barokologadi CPA had secured title to most of Melorane 
but had few of the promised development funds and was still enmeshed in comanagement 
negotiations with the Parks and Tourism Board in mid-2010.45 Despite the slow implementation 
of the settlement, however, the CPA had raised about 300,000 rand from its members, secured a 
National Development Agency grant, partnered with a business development company, formed a 
joint venture with a local farmer, and started a livestock project on lands outside Madikwe Game 
Reserve by that point.46 Continuing to work toward their vision for the restored land, the 
Barokologadi had managed to obtain title to all but one farm, secure partial implementation of the 
comanagement agreement, raise more than 25 million rand in project funding from three national 
departments, and recruit investors to underwrite leisure tourism developments on their land by 
October 2015.47 State-recognized property rights now facilitate Barokologadi initiatives to use the 
restored land. 
Public policies intended to redress segregation and apartheid-era dispossession grant the 
dispossessed and their descendants a venue in which to articulate historical injury and to make 
claims on the state but do not alter dominant understandings, land-use patterns, and constellations 
of interests that favor present rights holders. Land and resource use struggles are deeply 
intertwined with conceptions of property, productivity, and value that disadvantage claimants.48 
The ill-founded presumption that nonwhite peoples did not own land before white settlement 
disadvantages dispossessed people in contemporary resource struggles as does Barokologadi and 
Machete people’s lack of property title prior to displacement, itself a constitutive element of their 
dispossession. The common view that collective land holding and resource management are less 
productive than individual private enterprise and less sustainable than state nature conservation 
also tilt the discursive terrain against claimants.49 Regional landowners and land users deployed 
these arguments in struggle, as seen in Barry York’s emphasis on his investment in and 
improvements to the land, and in the rhetorical weight parks and tourism parastatal agencies place 
on the public interest in conservation. 
Implying that land claimants would be poorer land stewards, these dominant discourses force land 
claimants seeking unfettered property rights to demonstrate their readiness to maintain and 
improve restored land. Perceived incapacity to meet that standard then provides a rationale for 
state decision makers to confer restricted rights on “successful” claimants or to defer settlement 
indefinitely, as in the Machete case. Perpetuating disadvantage, these practices and discourses not 
only subject claimants to standards the direct and indirect beneficiaries of their dispossession were 
never asked to meet—as discussed in the next section—but also disregard both the adverse effects 
of displacement on dispossessed people’s resources and the substantial state resources directed to 
beneficiaries. As T. Z. Molwantwa commented, “Some farms that were taken away from the white 
farmers have become unproductive. I said, who is to blame? Because the people were forcibly 
removed, and their skill was destroyed, and the young generation should take over, but there is no 
skill. So you can’t blame us. The government should have trained the young ones because they 
saw that the land was going back to its rightful owners.”50 
The next section describes the gradual dispossession of black denizens of Madikwe and 
Mapungubwe. Detailing the state-led and state-sanctioned processes through which black 
landholders in these places were deprived of formal property rights and then effectively 
dispossessed while state resources were directed toward white settlers, I then consider subsequent 
land-use change and the state’s role within it. 
Consequential Claims, Gradual Dispossession 
Settler State Land Claims 
Preceded by more than a century of turbulence in which conflict among Tswana chieftaincies, 
raiding by Mzilikazi’s expansionist Ndebele kingdom, and the movement of Griqua, Kora, and 
white people through the territory led to displacement and greater centralization among the 
surviving African polities, the formal dispossession of black people in present-day Limpopo and 
North West provinces began when white Afrikaans-speaking settlers (Voortrekkers) asserted 
ownership of the territory after the 1837 defeat of Mzilikazi by African and Afrikaner forces.51 
The small fragmented Voortrekker settlements controlled only a small portion of the territory at 
the time. However, the Voortrekkers secured British assent to the dispossession of black denizens 
in 1852 through the Sand River Convention in which British government formally recognized the 
independence of the Trekkers who had migrated north of the Vaal River and repudiated its previous 
agreements with black residents. Shortly thereafter, the fractured Voortrekker communities created 
a new polity later named the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (the South African Republic) and 
proclaimed their ownership of and authority over the territory north of the Vaal River and south 
of the Limpopo River. Deliberately disregarding black people’s land rights and effective control 
over much of the territory, these Voortrekker land claims initiated the formation of a new property 
rights regime and laid the foundation for twenty-first-century land struggles. 
The 1837 and 1852 Voortrekker land claims were more “notional” than real at first.52 White settlers 
did not control most of the land and existed in complex relationship to several larger and longer 
resident African communities. The northernmost settlement of Zoutpansberg was situated within 
a “disturbed but crowded African world” comprised of nearby Venda, Pedi, Lobedu, and Langa 
polities and the powerful Ndebele and Gaza in the periphery, for example.53 Centered in the 
Zoutpan Mountains and encompassing the Mapungubwe region, Zoutpansberg “depended on the 
acquiescence, and even collaboration, of African neighbors.”54 Conflict within and among the 
Zoutpansbergers and the Venda led to the dissolution of the settlement in 1867, and few white 
people settled on lands north of the Zoutpan before 1914, nearly fifty years later.55 The other 
Voortrekker settlements shifted back and forth between working with, relying upon, and fighting 
nearby black and mixed-race communities from their founding through the late 1870s.56 
The South African Republic’s enormous territorial claim was immensely consequential despite its 
initially fictive nature, for its “notional ownership” discursively emptied the territory.57 Both a 
bundle of rights and a social relation, “property is distinguished from mere momentary possession 
or longer-term access by virtue of being recognized by others, through enforcement by society or 
the state, and by custom, convention or law,” as Christian Lund writes.58 But whose recognition, 
enforcement, customs, or laws matter? While access to, ownership of, and control over land and 
people were fundamentally contested between the 1830s and the 1880s, white settler recognition, 
conventions, and laws eventually became hegemonic. Determined to create a white supremacist 
polity allowing “No equality of Coloureds with Whites either in Church or state,” as their 1856 
constitution stated, these settlers consistently refused to formally recognize black, Khoisan, and 
mixed-race people’s property rights and land tenure systems, instead treating nonwhites as 
rightless land dwellers.59 “In this imaginary environment, lands lay open for disposal by the state, 
and extant occupation and land use rarely figured except as onerous problems in need of 
resolution,” as Lindsay Braun writes.60 
The republic generously distributed this ostensibly empty land, allowing each white male trekker 
to claim two large farms for eventual registration and inspection by state officials and using land 
grants to fund its operations and pay its officials while setting aside only small portions of the 
territory for black denizens.61 An 1886 act declared the Zoutpansberg to be government land and 
provided for the allocation of farms to white adult males who would ensure the land was 
“beneficially occupied”—a condition rarely satisfied or enforced.62 Twenty-eight percent of South 
African Republic territory had been allocated to white people and companies by 1860, 56 percent 
by 1890, and 66.9 percent by 1911. White people and companies registered titles throughout the 
South African Republic but rarely settled in the two northernmost districts, which accounted for 
only 5 percent of white residents in 1873.63 Nor did white claimants quickly settle in lands 
controlled by powerful African polities. Most claimants to Pedi land quickly sold their newly 
acquired land to companies, speculators, or land agents, for example.64 State land grants facilitated 
land speculation and enabled well-positioned officials to accumulate large landholdings but did 
not quickly increase the state’s effective control over territory.65 
The South African Republic’s notional ownership placed new burdens on black denizens, 
obligating most who wanted to retain state-sanctioned access to the land on which they lived, 
farmed, and hunted to purchase it from the republic or from white titleholders or to work for those 
owners.66 Black land purchase was impeded by republic policies such as Volksraad Resolution 
181 of June 18, 1855, which explicitly excluded “coloured people” from burghership and declared 
that “no person who is not recognized as a broker shall have the right to possess immovable 
property.”67 The state refused to register black land purchases except through white trustees until 
the Tsewu v. Registrar of Deeds decision of 1905 mandated it do so. 
 
The transfer of the South African Republic to British administration and its subsequent 
incorporation into the Union of South Africa in 1909 as the Transvaal province was followed by 
gradual consolidation of state control over the land the republic had seized and redistributed. The 
Natives Land Act of 1913, the Natives Land and Trust Act of 1936, and a long series of other 
proclamations, ordinances, and acts racialized the national territory, allocating a small portion for 
black settlement while raising the already substantial barriers to land acquisition and making it 
increasingly difficult for black people to reside on putatively white land without working for white 
landowners. 
 
Trying to retain access to land in this hostile context, black people employed diverse strategies to 
slow or limit dispossession, reclaim lost lands, and secure formal property rights. Nineteenth-
century leaders Sekhukhune and Nyabela aggressively challenged claims to Pedi and Ndebele 
lands, filing formal petitions and disputing title while their followers remained resident until 
military defeats left them unable to protect much of their territory after the 1870s.68 Active 
participants in the South African War, some black communities in the Western Transvaal 
reclaimed former territory by force, gains that were reversed by the British shortly after the war 
ended in 1902.69 Other black residents circumvented race-based property restrictions by 
purchasing farms through white missionaries and other trustees. Black Transvaalers held title to 
118 farms or farm portions through trustees in 1904, 591 properties in 1913, and 867 properties in 
1936, the year in which the state took control of trust lands.70 
 
Most black residents of the Transvaal neither lived in a powerful African polity nor managed to 
secure state-recognized land rights through a grant or a trustee, however. These denizens’ 
continued residence gradually became dependent on white titleholders. Rather than summarily 
expelling black dwellers or farming the lands themselves, many white landowners and private 
companies instead engaged in “native farming,” generating income by charging black occupants 
cash, labor, or in-kind rent. Stanley Trapido argues, “The major source of profit from agriculture… 
lay in the various forms of rent paid by African producers who had often been the cultivators of 
the land prior to its seizure by Afrikaner settlers.”71 Immensely profitable for white landowners, 
these practices contributed to the impoverishment of black Transvaalers. 
Dispossession and Displacement in Madikwe and Mapungubwe 
The five contemporary communities with the strongest ties to Madikwe—the Balete ba 
Lekgophung, Bahurutshe ba ga Suping, Baphalane ba Sesobe, Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe, and 
Batlokwa boo kgosi ba ga Matlapeng—each relocated multiple times during the nineteenth 
century, moving back and forth across the Marico and Limpopo Rivers during Mzilikazi’s reign.72 
The Barokologadi settled at Melorane and the Baphalane at Vleischfontein in the present-day 
Madikwe Game Reserve before 1884 while the Balete, Bahurutshe, and Batlokwa settled in the 
surrounding area.73 Machete and Tshivhula people also settled in the Mapungubwe region well 
before the turn of the twentieth century, with the Machete residing near the Limpopo-Shashe River 
confluence and the Tshivhula based farther south near the Zoutpan Mountains.74 Distance from 
larger and more powerful black polities and the absence of white settlers allowed Machete leaders 
to exert authority over much of northern Mapungubwe, even though both the Venda and the 
Tshivhula contend the Machete were a subject group.75 Mulaudzi attributes the lack of state-
proclaimed black locations in the region to this perception, writing, “[Denizens] were erroneously 
assumed by the state to be under the [Venda] Mphephu chiefdom.”76 Reflecting these unresolved 
disputes, the Tshivhula included Machete land in their restitution claim even as the Machete 
independently sought restitution. 
Settler and state land seizures directly affected the Madikwe and Mapungubwe regions, first 
rendering black denizens formally landless and then facilitating the individual and collective 
displacement of many people. Most Madikwe land remained putatively white after the 
Voortrekkers’ nineteenth-century assertion of ownership. Resident since at least 1872, the 
Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe place tried but failed to purchase Melorane and were deemed rent 
payers while Melorane was labeled a “black spot” in 1836 and sold to three white brothers in 
1838.77 The Zeerust native commissioner then secured the forcible removal of the Barokologadi 
in 1950. Jesuit missionaries purchased the Vleischfontein farm on which the Baphalane ba Sesobe 
had long resided from the white trader Auguste Greite in 1883–84.78 After conflict arose between 
Africanist Baphalane and church authorities regarding the annual rent payment of a portion of each 
harvest and other issues, Catholic officials closed the Vleischfontein mission station in the late 
1940s and then sought and eventually secured the forcible eviction of the remaining Baphalane.79 
The Bahurutshe ba ga Suping, Balete ba Lekgophung, and Batlokwa boo kgosi ba ga Matlapeng 
each avoided collective displacement, securing title to the farms and farm portions where they 
lived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.80 The South African government later 
designated these places for black settlement and then declared these lands part of Bophuthatswana. 
Black denizens of Mapungubwe were formally dispossessed upon the creation of the South African 
Republic in the mid-nineteenth century, and neither that polity nor its successors allocated any 
land for black settlement in the region. Conditions changed little for several decades, however, as 
whites were slow to claim and occupy land in this remote region. Despite the surveying of the 
Mapungubwe region in the 1860s and allocation of at least eleven farms between 1870 and 1886, 
the region was perceived to be entirely without white occupants in 1906.81 The 1912 Land 
Settlement Act and 1914 extension of rail service to the town of Musina increased white 
landholding and settlement, principally by poor “‘pap and game’ farmers” who couldn’t afford to 
buy elsewhere, relied heavily on hunting, and struggled with indebtedness despite repeated 
government forgiveness of their loans.82 White absentee ownership remained high throughout 
most of the twentieth century, as the following statistics indicate: only 16.5 percent of blacks in 
the northern Zoutpansberg lived on locations in 1905; only twenty-seven of eighty farms slated for 
inclusion in the proposed Dongola Wild Life Sanctuary in Mapungubwe had resident owners in 
the mid-1940s; and about 90 percent of farms around Musina lacked white occupants in the mid-
1980s.83 Lack of state-recognized property rights made black residents vulnerable to expulsion 
nevertheless. 
Most long-resident black denizens of Mapungubwe were eventually displaced, not through 
collective forced removals but through the state-sanctioned imposition of increasingly adverse 
conditions. Taking advantage of race-based policies allowing at-will evictions, restricting 
livestock, imposing labor requirements, and then ending labor tenancy, many landowners either 
evicted black residents or enforced rules that made it difficult to remain when their presence was 
no longer desired. In the Machete case, elders attribute the disbanding of their settlement to a 
farmer who prohibited hunting and ordered them to reduce the number of livestock, conditions 
that led the then chief and other community members to leave the farm.84 Born at Machete in 1914, 
Jim Mulaudzi recounted leaving the village with his parents as a child because white people came 
to occupy the area. “They didn’t give us a place to settle, so we decided to go around to the farms. 
Some went to Zimbabwe and Botswana.”85 Another longtime resident, who was born in the 1940s, 
highlighted how the simple presence of white people could spur movement. Asserting that his 
father and forefathers were born and buried in Mapungubwe, Saul Sematla told me, “Our fathers 
ran away because they were scared of the whites. They went somewhere where there were no 
whites. As time goes on, the whites came where they are.”86 Displacement led to the fragmentation 
of the Machete and Tshivhula communities as some individuals, families, and small groups moved 
to different farms while others who could not secure farm employment or found it “unbearable” 
moved to black townships on the outskirts of Musina or Alldays or to more distant places.87 
Transformations: Land-Use Change in Mapungubwe and Madikwe 
The state-led and state-sanctioned dispossession and displacement of long-resident black people 
created the conditions for the agricultural and touristic transformations of Madikwe and 
Mapungubwe, changes that made full restoration of lost lands highly improbable. First converted 
into commercial irrigated farms and cattle ranches, large portions of these regions then were 
transformed into nature tourism destinations, game farms, and game ranches in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s. State officials and policies played a role in the transformation of both regions. In the 
Madikwe case, the apartheid government expropriated twenty-eight agricultural farms and the 
Vleischfontein mission station, and then transferred title to the Bophuthatswana government as 
part of its effort to consolidate that notoriously fragmented bantu-stan. The Bophuthatswana 
government used most of the transferred land to create the Madikwe Game Reserve while leasing 
the remaining land to Barry York and to baruakgomo, the black commercial farmers. 
In the Mapungubwe case, state policies first subsidized white agriculture and then encouraged a 
shift away from it. Through the 1980s, Mapungubwe landowners not only received the assistance 
and market protections to which all white farmers were entitled but also benefited from generous 
farmer assistance programs meant to prevent “terrorist” incursions from Zimbabwe and Botswana 
by supporting farmers who lived within 10 kilometers (later extended to 50 kilometers) of the 
border. Border programs granted living allowances; land and livestock purchase assistance; feed, 
transportation, and borehole subsidies; and low or no-interest loans. 
The government reversed course in the 1990s with apartheid’s demise, abolishing the border 
assistance programs, reducing agricultural subsidies and trade barriers, and highlighting 
Mapungubwe as a symbol of South Africa’s rich past while partnering with the DeBeers 
Corporation to establish the Mapungubwe National Park. Coinciding with a dramatic increase in 
international tourist travel to South Africa, these changes encouraged many landowners to shift 
fully or partially from agriculture to nature tourism, game hunting, and game farming in the 1990s 
and 2000s. State recognition and respect for landowners’ property rights granted them substantial 
influence over the pace and direction of land-use change. 
Conclusion 
Contemporary land and resource struggles occur on a terrain shaped by more than a century of 
racialized dispossession. State-led and state-sanctioned land seizures structure the political 
economic context in which people contend for control over Madikwe and Mapungubwe. The 
nineteenth-century repudiation of black denizens’ property rights, granting of land rights to white 
settlers and business people, and imposition of substantial barriers to black land acquisition served 
as the foundation for the twentieth- and twenty-first-century land transfers through which present 
landowners and leaseholders gained state-recognized rights. Long-ago settler polity land claims 
and the subsequent state and market-mediated transfers produced enduring changes in the physical 
landscape, first obscuring traces of black settlement with fences, crops, and grazing lands and then 
transforming large portions of Madikwe and Mapungubwe into tourist-friendly wilderness. 
Twenty-first-century rural struggles reflect the distinct constellations of interests produced by past 
dispossession and displacement. Too often, these conflicts pit the well-resourced beneficiaries of 
historical dispossession—state-recognized land-owners and land users—against their often 
impoverished victims—black landholders and their descendants who could not secure state-
recognized property rights. Excluded from the state and market-mediated land sales and 
contractual arrangements through which Mapungubwe National Park, the Venetia Limpopo 
Nature Reserve, Venetia Diamond Mine, and Madikwe Game Reserve were created, most black 
land claimants and black land dwellers are forced to rely on moral suasion, protest, and public 
opinion in circumstances where capital is more influential. Land and natural resource struggles 
throughout South Africa require a fuller reckoning with the past. 
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